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COMMENTARY
In Praise of State Courts: Confessions
of a Federal Judge*
By J.

SKELLY WRIGHT**

"Confession is good for the soul-and good for the sentence."
Such is the wisdom of the criminal courts. In the hope of like treatment, I, too, wish to make a confession: until recently, I have failed to
appreciate fully the contributions state courts and state judges have
made, are making, and can yet make in vindicating our liberties, assuring equality of treatment to all our people, and combatting unfairness.
For years, I credited all such achievements to the federal courts. State
judges, as I saw them, were at best faithful followers; at worst, obstructionists. Seldom were state judges looked to for leadership in constitutional law.
The time is overdue to make amends. And there can be no more
appropriate occasion than today, when we inaugurate a series of lectures in honor of a truly great state judge, Mathew Tobriner. Twenty
years a member of the California Supreme Court, Justice Tobriner has
been described as "the nation's most outstanding state court judge."'
The Justice long ago announced his belief that the courts offer "It]he
*."..2
And he
last recourse of the individual against oppression .
meant it. As a judge, Tobriner did not hesitate to implement his faith
in "the importance of individuality and the need to defend it against
the organizational imperatives of both government and private institutions," even when sustaining this claim meant giving wide latitude "to
*

First Mathew 0. Tobriner Memorial Lecture, given at Hastings College of the Law,

University of California, October 4, 1983.
** Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. I am
indebted to Louis Fenner Claiborne for his research and writing in preparation of this
lecture.
1. Tribe, Remembering Mathew Tobriner, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 876, 876 (1982).
2. Tobriner, IndividualRights in an IndustrializedSociety, 54 A.B.A. J. 21, 23 (1968)

quoted in Bird, Justice Mathew 0. Tobriner-The Heart of a Lion, The Soul of a Dove, 70
CALIF. L. REV. 871, 873 (1982).
[1651
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eccentrics, to deviants, to the profane, to the incorrigible." 3 Moreover,
Justice Tobriner required no lead from the Supreme Court of the
United States: though seldom acknowledged, the influence was often
4
in the opposite direction.
Yet, I confess that I was almost unaware at the time that Justice
Tobriner, as well as other state judges-his contemporaries and those
of an earlier day--could be our mentors. Of course, I put aside the
whole field of private law, where state courts, at least since Erie v.
Tompkins,5 have had the first and the last word, and where distinguished state judges, Justice Tobriner among them,6 have made almost
all the significant contributions. Nor am I concerned today with that
large body of public law cases which is the exclusive grist of one court
system or the other. My focus is restricted to issues which equally concern--or should concern-both state and federal courts: shielding citizens from the abuses of governmental power, whether attributable to
malice, excessive zeal, or mere convenience, and assuring equal treatment for all. In the convenient shorthand, I speak of civil liberties and
civil rights.
In partial atonement for my previous default in failing to recognize the past and present role of state courts as guardians of our freedoms, I have re-examined my own experience, asking myself why I was
so blind to the contributions of the state judiciary. My own story is no
doubt extreme, but it is not wholly without a lesson for all those who sit
on the federal bench-and perhaps also for state judges. I have also
read some judicial history, rediscovering the fact-no doubt familiar to
others-that, on the whole, for the first century of our existence as a
nation, the state courts, not the federal courts, stood alone as the champions of our individual liberties. And, finally, I have force-fed myself
much of the voluminous material on the current debate among judges
and professors about "parity," "comity," and "federalism." This has
led me to some conclusions about the future-mainly optimism concerning the increasingly important contribution state judges are making
and will be making in protecting the individual rights of all our people.
None of this has come easily for me. I want you to know how
much of a wrench it is for an old federal judge to look beyond the
federal court reports for precedents, or for the materials out of which
3. Balabanian, Justice Was More Than His Title, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 878, 879 (1982).
4. See, e.g., In re Tucker, 5 Cal. 3d 171, 184, 486 P.2d 657, 665, 95 Cal. Rptr. 761, 769
(1971) (concerning the procedural rights of parolees); People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398
P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965) (anticipating Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 36 (1966)).
5. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
6. See the articles cited in Balabanian, supra note 3, at 878 n.l.
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judgments are made. Nowyour punishment is that you must listen to
my confession, my rehearsal of familiar history, and my ruminations
about the course we should set in the years to come.
I
My bias was no doubt influenced by time and place, and an unusually long service on the federal payroll. I have been a federal judge
for thirty-four years. Before that I was a United States Attorney in
New Orleans. Still earlier, I was a federal prosecutor; during the War,
a United States military advocate in London, and then again a federal
prosecutor. Afterwards, for a very brief interlude, I practiced as a private lawyer, in Washington, D.C., when the federal courts there handled all but the most trivial cases. As United States Attorney and
federal district judge in New Orleans, I had little occasion to look to
state courts for guidance, except in private law cases when I was bound
to accept from them state law rules of property, tort, and contract.
That is even more true of the last twenty-one years I spent on the federal court of appeals in Washington, D.C.
Obviously, my own geography helped to insulate me from any
awareness of the role state courts can play. Home rule in the District of
Columbia is too recent and too limited to have spawned any independent judicial tradition. My other duty station was Louisiana, where I
was born and raised, a place with a unique legal history and no lack of
litigating spirit. But, in my time at least, the Louisiana courts were not
on the cutting edge of public law. Louisiana was not California.
I came to the practice of public law soon after the assassination of
Huey Long in September, 1935. As virtual ruler of Louisiana, first as
Governor and then as United States Senator with a puppet as Governor, Long had deliberately gained control, not only of both houses of
the Louisiana legislature, but of a majority of the state supreme court
as well.7 The result, a court composed of judges chosen for political
loyalty rather than judicial impartiality, was hardly calculated to imbue
respect for the state judiciary in a young lawyer--especially one whose
new job was to aid in the federal prosecution of some of the frauds,'
including vote fraud,9 committed by Long's associates. Some of those
7. See T. WILLIAMS, HuEY LONG 565-67 (Knopf ed. 1969).
8. See, e.g., Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S.
574 (1941) (use of mails to defraud board of levee commissioners in bond refunding plan);
Leche v. United States, 118 F.2d 246 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 617 (1941) (use of
mails to defraud state highway department in its purchase of motor trucks). See also United
States v. Leche, 34 F. Supp. 982 (W.D. La. 1940).
9. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
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cases the state itself had declined to bring, and we believed, would in
no event survive review by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
In those days, the Louisiana Supreme Court was not merely political to an unusual degree. It was an enthusiastic partner in the then
prevailing regime of race discrimination. A few decades earlier, the
Supreme Court of Louisiana had written Plessy v. Ferguson,"0 a decision affirmed, as we all know, by the Supreme Court of the United
States. Until at least the late 1960's, the Louisiana courts persisted in
sustaining segregation and discrimination long after such actions had
been authoritatively condemned as unconstitutional. Thus, exclusion
of blacks from grand and petit juries, a federal crime since 1875" and
declared illegal by the United States Supreme Court in a series of cases
in 1880,12 continued to be excused by the Louisiana high court, despite
repeated reminders from the United States Supreme Court.

3

Simi-

larly, several years after racial zoning ordinances had been held unconstitutional in Buchanan v. Warley,' a the Louisiana Supreme Court
refused to acquiesce.' 5 It was left to the federal courts to strike down
the state's discriminatory voting laws and practices' 6 and those laws
segregating public places. 7 And, as I have good reason to remember,
the Louisiana courts offered no assistance in desegregating higher edu10. See Exparte Plessy, 45 La. Ann. 80 (1893), af'd sub nomL Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896).
11. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 336 (1948) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 243).
12. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313
(1879); Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
13. See, e.g., Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S.
584 (1958); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625
(1972).
14. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
15. Tyler v. Harmon, 160 La. 943, 107 So. 704 (1926), rev'd, 273 U.S. 668 (1927); Tyler
v. Harmon, 158 La. 439, 104 So. 200 (1925).
16. See Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964); United States v. Clement, 231 F.
Supp. 913 (W.D. La. 1964); Louisiana v. United States, 225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963),
afd 380 U.S. 145 (1965); United States v. Wilder, 222 F. Supp. 749 (W.D. La. 1963); United
States v. Fox, 211 F. Supp. 25 (E.D. La. 1962), affid, 334 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1964); United
States v. Manning, 206 F. Supp. 623 (W.D. La. 1962); United States v. Ass'n of Citizens
Councils, 196 F. Supp. 908 (W.D. La. 1961); United States v. McElveen, 180 F. Supp. 10
(E.D. La.), afd sub nom. United States v. Thomas, 362 U.S. 58 (1960); United States v.
Crawford, 229 F. Supp. 898 (W.D. La. 1964).
17. See, e.g., Lassiter v. United States, 203 F. Supp. 20 (W.D. La.), a]Pdmerr, 371 U.S.
10 (1962); State Athletic Comm'n v. Dorsey, 168 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. La. 1958), a 'dmera,
359 U.S. 533 (1959); New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122
(5th Cir.), afd mem., 358 U.S. 54 (1958).
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cation"8 or implementing Brown v. Board of Education 9 in state primary and secondary schools. 20 On the contrary, the state courts

approved efforts to destroy the NAACP 2' and sustained criminal con-

victions against individuals engaged in peaceful efforts to end the re-

gime of racial separation.22
Nor has the insensitivity of the Louisiana Supreme Court been restricted to race cases. It has approved violations of the First,'
18. See Tureaud v. Board of Supervisors, 116 F. Supp. 248 (E.D. La. 1953), rev'd, 207
F.2d 807 (5th Cir.), vacated, 347 U.S. 971 (1954); Wilson v. Board of Supervisors, 92 F.
Supp. 986 (E.D. La. 1950), a/f'd, 340 U.S. 909 (1951). See also Guillory v. Administrators of
Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La.), vacated, 207 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. La.), 212 F.
Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962).
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. See Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 204 F. Supp. 568 (E.D. La.), modified, 205 F.
Supp. 893 (ED. La.), a/f'd in part, 308 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1962); Bush v. Orleans Parish
School Bd., 194 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. La.), aF'dsubnom. Gremillion v. United States, 368 U.S.
11 (1961); Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 191 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. La.), a/f'dsub nom.
Louisiana v. United States, 367 U.S. 908 (1961); Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 188 F.
Supp. 916 (E.D. La.), stay denied, 365 U.S. 500 (1960), aff'd, 364 U.S. 569 (1961); Bush v.
Orleans Parish School Bd., 187 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. La.), stay denied, 364 U.S. 803 (1960),
aff'd, 365 U.S. 569 (1961); Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 163 F. Supp. 701 (E.D. La.
1958), a/i'd,268 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1959); Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 138 F. Supp. 337
(E.D. La. 1956), a/i'd, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1957), 252 F.2d 253 (5th Cir.), cert.denied, 356
U.S. 969 (1958). See also St. Helena Parish School Bd. v. Hall, 287 F.2d 376 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied,368 U.S. 830 (1961); Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La.
1961), aft'd, 368 U.S. 515 (1962).
21. See Louisiana exrel Gremillionv. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961),a/i'g 181 F. Supp.
37 (E.D. La. 1960) (state statute requiring principal officer of social or other organizations to
file annually a list of names and addresses of its membership held unconstitutional as applied to the NAACP). See also State v. NAACP, 90 So.2d 884 (La. Ct. App. 1956) (injunction granted by state court restraining NAACP from conducting business in state held null
and void).
22. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (state breach of peace statute used to convict five demonstrators for sitting quietly and refusing to leave public library held unconstitutionally overbroad); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (once police designate a proper
area to demonstrate, protestors cannot be convicted under a valid ordinance prohibiting
demonstrations "near" a court house); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (city officials
cannot exercise unfettered discretion to prohibit peaceful parades and meetings); Lombard
v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963) (conviction of black students under state criminal mischief
statute for conducting peaceful sit-in at segregated lunch counter violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (convictions of blacks for disturbing the peace by conducting peaceful sit-in at segregated lunch
counter violated due process guarantee).
23. See Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974) (Louisiana Supreme Court's
construction of ordinance prohibiting the use of "obscene or approbrious language toward
or with reference to" a police officer held susceptible of application to protected speech and,
therefore, overbroad); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (Louisiana Supreme
Court's reinstatement of trial court's finding of defamation of a public official reversed and
remanded because of insufficient evidence demonstrating that petitioner acted in reckless
disregard of the truth or falsity of his statements); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964)
(state criminal defamation statute, as interpreted by the Louisiana Supreme Court, incorpo-
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Fourth,2 4 Sixth,2 5 and Eighth 26 Amendments, as well as the Due Process Clause.27 It has condoned unconstitutional abridgement of the
rights of women2 8 and illegitimate children.29 And equally important,
the highest court of my state, while I was there, never broke new
ground to vindicate civil liberties or to promote equality of rights. It
did not, for instance, take the occasion in the Willie Francis case3" to
rule unlawful on state law grounds the second attempted electrocution
of a condemned seventeen-year-old black youth. The court's failure to
act cost Willie Francis his life-and, incidentally,
lost me my first case
31
before the United States Supreme Court.
Finally, I should add that the Louisiana courts in my day did not
always observe the limitations on their jurisdiction or respect the principles of comity toward the federal courts. There were brief attempts to
interfere with the implementation of desegregation decrees issued by a
rated constitutionally invalid standards in reviewing criticism of public officials); Grosjean
v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (Louisiana statute imposing a license tax on
publications that sell advertising space and enjoy a circulation of more than 20,000 copies
per week violated freedom of the press by restricting circulation).
24. See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970) (warrantless search of house subsequent
to defendant's arrest outside the house held invalid).
25. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (Louisiana statute's categorical exclusion of women from jury lists held unconstitutional); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968) (despite contrary provisions in the Louisiana Constitution, the right to jury trial attaches to any crime punishable by six or more months imprisonment); Turner v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 466 (1965) (in a criminal proceeding, the close and continuous association of key
prosecution witness and the jury deprived defendant of right to trial by an impartial jury).
26. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (Louisiana statute imposing
mandatory death sentence for first degree murder conviction without allowing consideration
of mitigating factors held unconstitutional); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (Louisiana's attempt to limit the scope of capital murder by adopting narrower definition of first
degree murder is inadequate response to mandatory death sentence statute).
27. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969) (labor-management inquiry board's
failure to provide accused with procedural safeguards held unconstitutional); Rideau v.
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (refusal of defendant's request for change of venue following
television broadcast of taped confession held to be a denial of due process); Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154 (1962) (conviction of blacks under breach-of-the-peace statute, for waiting
at customarily segregated bus depot, reversed).
28. See Guste v. Weeks, 429 U.S. 1056 (1977).
29. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (denial of compensation to illegitimate dependent children by Louisiana worker's compensation statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68 (1968) (state wrongful death statute, construed by Louisiana Supreme Court to deny
a right of recovery to illegitimate children for the death of a parent, violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
30. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
31. For a fascinating account of the Willie Francis case in and out of court, see Miller &
Bowman, "Slow Dance on the Killing Ground" The Willie Francis Case Revisited, 32 DE
PAUL L. REv. 1 (1983).
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United States district court.3 2 Equally questionable was the reluctance
of some state judges to defer to the federal courts when the title of the
United States to valuable oil lands was at stake. At one point, the
Supreme Court of the United States, having assumed original jurisdiction to decide the boundary between federal and state offshore sub33
merged lands, had to enjoin like proceedings in a Louisiana court.
And, later, I found myself, as United States district judge, required to
restrain a state court action that would have adjudicated federal title to
onshore oil lands behind the back of the federal government. 3 4
So much for special pleading. I have thus far turned a straightfor-

ward admission of guilt into a plea of "confession and avoidance" by
claiming as a unique defense my Louisiana perspective. But I wonder

if my outlook would have been markedly different had I been located
in a more "progressive" state-say California. Would the judgments of
the California Supreme Court have led me to appreciate more quickly
the important role of state courts in constitutional adjudication? Alas,

a cursory look at what that court was doing in the 1930's, 1940's, and
1950's makes me doubt it.
In California, too, there was a long history of government-authorized race discrimination sustained by the state courts. There, of course,
the victims had yellow, not black, skins. For three-quarters of a century, with mixed results in the United States Supreme Court, the Cali-

fornia Supreme Court sustained a full range of laws and ordinances
discriminating against Chinese 35 and Japanese. 36 And the California
32. See Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 187 F. Supp. 42, 43, 46 (E.D. La. 1960),
a~"d, 365 U.S. 569 (1961).
33. United States v. Louisiana, 351 U.S. 978 (1956).
34. See Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957).
35. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (San Francisco municipal ordinance
requiring licenses for laundries and limiting operation to laundries within brick or stone
buildings held invalid because it was used to arbitrarily discriminate against Chinese laundries); Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 (1885) (upholding San Francisco ordinance requiring licenses for laundries and limiting operation to daytime hours since nothing in
language of ordinance supported allegation of arbitrary discrimination against Chinese);
Barbier v. Connoly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885) (upholding San Francisco ordinance similar to ordinance upheld in Soon Hing on ground that ordinance promoted public health and safety);
Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876) (reversing California Supreme Court by striking
down statute requiring payment of a bond by certain classes of foreign immigrants arriving
in California by ship).
36. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (reversing California
Supreme Court by finding unconstitutional a statute barring issuance of commercial fishing
licenses to persons "ineligible for citizenship" as discriminatory against Japanese); Oyama v.
California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (reversing California Supreme Court and finding Alien Land
Law unconstitutional as applied to a minor American citizen and his Japanese father); Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934) (reversing the California Supreme Court, which had
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court was no more hospitable to "undesirable" immigrants from within
the United States. 37 Nor would I have been able to applaud the California Supreme Court's record in vindicating First Amendment rights
ifI had been a federal judge there instead of in Louisiana.3" Much less
would I have seen anything to emulate in many of that court's criminal
law rulings in the 1940's, 1950's, and early 1960's, especially those condoning stomach-pumping 39 or unconfined searches incident to arrest to
gather evidence, 40 and those prejudicing the procedural rights of
41
indigents.

upheld a conviction for conspiracy to violate the Alien Land Law); Cockrill v. California,
268 U.S. 258 (1925) (upholding California's Alien Land Law under which Japanese subjects
were not permitted to acquire agricultural lands in the state).
37. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (reversing a California Supreme
Court decision that had upheld a state statute making it unlawful to knowingly bring into
the state an indigent person.
38. See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (finding unconstitutional a Los
Angeles ordinance making it a misdemeanor to distribute handbills that did not include the
name and address of the person sponsoring their distribution); Smith v. California, 361 U.S.
147 (1959) (finding unconstitutional a Los Angeles ordinance making mere possession of
obscene writings unlawful regardless of scienter); First Unitarian Church v. Los Angeles,
357 U.S. 545 (1958) (reversing California Supreme Court by finding unconstitutional a California statute requiring applicants for religious tax-exempt status to sign an oath declaring
that they did not advocate overthrow of state or federal government); Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513 (1958) (reversing California Supreme Court by finding unconstitutional a statute
requiring applicants for veterans' tax exemption to sign an oath declaring that they did not
advocate overthrow of state or federal government); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252
(1941) (overturning California Supreme Court decision affirming the contempt convictions
of a newspaper publisher and editor for the publication of editorials commenting on cases
pending in a state court); Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1939) (reversing a conviction
under a California statute making it unlawful for picketers to display banners in the vicinity
of any place of business); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (striking down as
void for vagueness part of a California statute condemning the display of a red flag in a
public place or a meeting place); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (upholding
conviction of communists under Syndicalism Act as not violative of the First Amendment).
39. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
40. See Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818 (1969) (finding unconstitutional a warrantless search of defendant's house where defendant was arrested outside of the house); Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (reversing California Supreme Court and holding that a
warrantless search of defendant's house could not be constitutionally justified as incident to
arrest even where officers had an arrest warrant); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964)
(reversing conviction based upon admission of evidence illegally obtained through warrantless search of defendant's hotel room); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (upholding as
incident to arrest a warrantless search); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (sustaining
conviction based upon admission of illegally obtained evidence); Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46 (1947) (affirming California Supreme Court decision upholding the constitutionality of provisions of the California Penal Code and state constitution that permit the failure
of a defendant to explain or deny evidence against him to be commented upon by court and
counsel and to be considered by court and jury).
41. Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969) (holding unconstitutional California's
denial of a free court transcript to indigent defendant); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
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The lesson of this digression, I suggest, is that my dismissive attitude toward state courts was not quite so insular as it might seem. It
was not so much a matter ofplace as a result of the times. I suspect that
if one examined the judgments of state courts anywhere during the first
half of this century, and even a little beyond, the trumpet of liberty
would seldom be heard, especially on behalf of the poor, the unpopular, and the unconventional. The courts of Massachusetts, New York,
Illinois, Virginia, Arizona, or Montana would probably fare no better
than those of Louisiana and California.4 2 I cannot suppose that Cardozo was less sensitive than his fellow state judges when, as Chief
Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, he dismissed the suggestion
that New York should follow the federal rule excluding illegally seized
evidence from criminal trials4 3 with the comment that this would require "the criminal . . . to go free because the constable has
blundered.""
Why is this so? It is, in some measure, because the Bill of Rights
and the post-Civil War Amendments were then in eclipse, even in the
federal courts, except as they protected private property. After all,
before Earl Warren became Chief Justice, the Supreme Court of the
United States had only occasionally, and hesitantly, spoken for personal freedom and equality of treatment. Lawyers and judges were still
mainly concerned with protecting corporate money, not the fate of ordinary people.
Of course, state courts were free to strike a blow for liberty or
equality on their own, invoking state constitutional provisions to that
end. But this was not, for the state judiciary, a period characterized by
boldness. One senses that most state judges were quite content to leave
(1963) (reversing convictions of indigent defendants denied appointment of counsel on appeal as of right). For other questionable California Supreme Court judgments, see those
reversed in Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (reversing convictions of indigent defendants denied appointment of counsel on appeal); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962) (finding unconstitutional a California statute making it a misdemeanor punishable by
imprisonment for any person to be addicted to narcotics); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S.
225 (1957) (finding unconstitutional a municipal ordinance making it an offense for convicted felons to remain in Los Angeles without registering with the Chief of Police, when
applied to persons without knowledge of the ordinance).
42. In fairness, I must note that the California Supreme Court, at least occasionally,
anticipated the Supreme Court of the United States in announcing more protective criminal
procedure rules (e.g, People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955) (exclusionary
rule)), or striking down blatant racial discrimination (Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198
P.2d 17 (1948)).
43. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See also Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886).
44. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
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it to the federal courts to deal with claims of liberty abridged or equality denied, especially when the victim was a criminal or a dissident
challenging the status quo. The cause and cure for this reticence is
what we should investigate.
By now, you will have concluded that my purported confession is
wholly exculpatory and that my announced intention to speak in praise
of state courts has turned sour. Not so. My suspicion is that the comparative passivity of the state judiciary until relatively recent days is, in
large measure, attributable to the dismissive attitude of federal judges,
an attitude prevailing for almost a century and continuing in some degree today. For too long, state judges have been treated with insufficient respect by their colleagues on the federal bench. I believe that in
consequence, some lost their self-respect, others dug in their heels, and
still others simply passed the buck. It was not always so, and it need
not continue to be so.
II
Let us go back two centuries to the heyday of the state courts. Indeed, for more than a dozen years between the Declaration of Independence and the ratification of the Constitution of the United States,
there were only state courts. 45 On the whole, the judges of that time
were stalwart defenders of liberty, invoking the newly promulgated
constitutions of their states or simply the fundamental principles of the
English common law or Magna Carta to defeat high-handed governmental action.4 6 They did not hesitate to void legislation which transgressed constitutional guarantees. They were not waiting for any lead
from the Supreme Court of the United States. Twenty years before
Marbury v. Madison,'47state courts had established the principle of judicial review.48
More important for my theme, the ratification of the Constitution
and the establishment of federal courts in 1789 did not alter the preeminence of the state courts as the guarantors of liberty for many decades thereafter. In this respect, they remained by far the most important courts for some time to come, often bolder than the Supreme
45. The only exception was the national Prize Court of Appeals established under the
Articles of Confederation. See Penhallow v. Doane's Adm'rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 54, 61-62, 8586, 95-96 (1795). Several decisions of that court are reported in 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 1-42 (1781-

1787).
46. See generall, R. POUND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES

OF LIBERTY 81-111, 185-97 (1957).
47. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
48. See R. POUND, supra note 46, at 97-101.
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Court of the United States in vindicating the rights of the citizen
against his government. 49 To be sure, many of the reasons are historical and of little relevance today. But there may yet be a message for us.
First, until Reconstruction, the only government that touched most
people was that of their state and, until the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments were adopted, state action was uncontrolled by the federal Bill of Rights50 and largely beyond the reach of federal courts.
Moreover, until the 1870's, the lower federal courts had no significant
federal question jurisdiction. It was not until 1816 that the Supreme
Court firmly asserted its power to revise state court judgments in civil
cases 5 1 and not until 1821 for criminal cases. 2 And, even after that
authority was declared, it remained precarious for some time.
The result was that state judges, applying state constitutional law,
knew themselves to be the final guardians of liberty, and acted accordingly. They might, of course, have defaulted with impunity-and, occasionally, they did. But, to a surprising degree for the time, state
judges, especially those sitting on appellate courts, were courageous
men, faithful to their oaths. During this period, ultimate responsibility
was taken seriously.
It is also true-whether this was cause or effect-that the state judiciary of the pre-Civil War era attracted the most distinguished lawyers. It is familiar history that Presidents Washington and Adams, at
least, had some difficulty persuading the leading lawyers or judges to
serve on the Supreme Court of the United States. Some judges
promptly deserted the federal court in favor of the more prestigious,
and then more important, state appellate courts.13 Indeed, until the
Civil War, it is perhaps safe to say that the only United States Supreme
Court Justices who deserve a place in the judicial Hall of Fame are
Marshall, Story, and Taney. Even a superficial reading of judicial his49. See generally E. CORWiN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 58-115 (1948).
50. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
51. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
52. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
53. In the dozen years before John Marshall became Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court, more than half of the twelve nominees to the Court who were actually
confirmed declined the office or resigned after brief service--sometimes more than once.
See 2 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 757-58 (1935). Sev-

eral other judges and lawyers approached by Washington and Adams declined appointment
and were never submitted for confirmation. See 1 id at 42, 57, 124-25, 139-40, 141, 153-55,
171-73. Of those who preferred high position on their own state courts, I note Robert Harrison, who, immediately after being confirmed by the Senate in 1790, declined a Supreme
Court seat to become Chancellor of Maryland, id at 42, and John Rutledge, who resigned
his place on the United States Supreme Court in 1791 to become Chief Justice of South
Carolina, id at 56-57.
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tory for that period leaves one with the conviction that this number
compares unfavorably with the state judiciary, where we had, among
many others, Chancellor Whyte, Judge Roane, and Chief Justice
Tucker of Virginia; Chancellors Livingston and Kent of New York;
and Chief Justices Parker and Shaw of Massachusetts.
This is not to say that the relative prestige of the United States
Supreme Court, and the federal courts generally, did not gradually increase. Chief Justice Marshall almost singlehandedly established the
federal Constitution as the supreme law of the land and the Supreme
Court as the final arbiter of the Constitution. His successor, Taneyuntil the dreadful Dred Scott decision in 1857 5 4-- brought the Court to
its position of unquestioned authority. 5 But the state courts lost little
thereby. There were, to be sure, tense moments of conflict.5 6 Yet, on
the whole, the national Court rarely interfered with state court decisions, and its celebrated judgments were almost all concerned with
property rights under the Contract Clause or the Commerce Clause.
The personal rights of ordinary citizens remained in the keeping of the
state judiciary.
I pass in silence the years of the Civil War, a period during which
courts, state and federal, were largely impotent in the face of military
authority. Reconstruction, of course, revolutionized the relations between the national government and state governments, and between
their court systems. Under the authority of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
54. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
55. See 2 C. WARREN, supra note 53, at 206.
56. See, e.g., Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859) (reversing the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin and holding the federal "fugitive slave law" constitutional); Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842) (striking down a Pennsylvania law punishing
those who "kidnapped" fugitive slaves in.that state for return to their owners as repugnant to
"the slave clause" of Art. IV of the Constitution-since rendered obsolete by the Thirteenth
Amendment); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (holding that the Cherokee
nation is a distinct and sovereign nation upon which the laws of the states can have no
force); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (overruling Maryland Court
of Appeals by holding that state legislation that interferes with constitutionally enacted legislation is invalid); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816) (Supreme Court
of the United States has the jurisdiction and authority to review all state court decisions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States); Fletcher v. Peck, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (holding that the legislature of Georgia in 1795 had the power to
dispose of unappropriated land within its own limits, and an attempt by a subsequent legislature to annul that act was an impairment of the right to contract); United States v. Peters, 9
U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809) (holding that state legislatures cannot annul the judgments or
determine the jurisdiction of the federal courts); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419
(1793) (holding that the Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction over a suit by a
citizen against a state). For instances of stubborn resistance to the authority of the United
States Supreme Court by the courts of Ohio and California, see 2 C. WARREN, supra note
53, at 254-58.
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and Fifteenth Amendments, Congress invested the federal courts with
extraordinary new responsibilities.5 7 Although primarily designed to
secure equal rights for the new freedmen against the recalcitrance of
the defeated Confederacy, these statutes, for the most part, had no geo-

graphical or racial limitations and eventually came to have as much
importance outside the South as within it.
The Reconstruction Amendments and their implementing legislation had three related effects on the state courts. First, new federal
rights and remedies were established, thereby modifying or overriding

state law, including in many respects the established practices of state
courts. Second, by opening the lower federal courts directly to civil
rights claims, and by 1875 to all cases founded on federal law, the state
courts henceforth could be bypassed in such cases. And finally, the
lower federal courts-as opposed to only the Supreme Court-were authorized to supervise or supersede the state courts in their implementation of federal law by habeas corpus, removal, and injunction. Many

would say that these laws were the beginning of the end of the independence of the state courts and the cause of their decline. For my part, I

doubt it.
Unquestionably, for a very brief time, federal courts in the conquered South to an important degree supplanted the state court systems
in the enforcement of constitutional rights. At first, albeit with some
lapses,5" the United States Supreme Court resolutely applied the Re-

construction legislation, sustaining the jurisdiction of the federal courts
to entertain original enforcement actions and to vindicate federal rights
57. The main statutes were the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385; the Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140;
the Act of Feb. 18, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433; the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat.
13; and the Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335. The surviving provisions are
today codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-43, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1443, 2241 (1982), and 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971(a), 1981-1983, 1985-1988 (1982). See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581, 1584 (1982) and 42
U.S.C. § 1994 (1982), derived from Reconstruction statutes of 1866, ch. 86, 14 Stat. 50, 1867,
ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546, and 1874, ch. 464, 18 Stat. 251. There were also, of course, more
temporary and localized "Force Acts," e.g., the Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat.
428; the Supplementary Act of 1867, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2, and the Second Supplementary Act of
1867, ch. 30, 15 Stat. 14.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (holding that the right of
assembly operates only upon the national government and was not intended to limit the
action of state governments with respect to their own citizens; that the Second Amendment
right to bear arms restricts only the power of the national, not the state, governments; and
that indictments under the Civil Rights Acts were unconstitutional as applied to persons
who had no connection with state governments and were not interfering with federal rights);
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876) (finding unconstitutional as beyond the authorization of the Fifteenth Amendment an act of Congress that authorized punishment of election inspectors for discriminating on account of race).
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by habeas corpus, removal, and injunction. 9 But, very soon, the
brakes were firmly applied. The Court itself narrowly construed the
new constitutional amendments and struck down many of the Reconstruction statutes; 6° the Congress repealed several of the surviving provisions,6 ' and the Executive Branch stopped its enforcement efforts. By
the mid-1880's, the state courts were largely left alone.
Although short-lived and ambiguous, the experience of Reconstruction stirred an illiberal reaction in the affected states and their
courts that continues in some measure to this day. It may well be that
Reconstruction lasted just long enough to instill hostility in states to
national "interference," including that of the federal courts, yet was
aborted too soon to educate the South and its judges to respect constitutional rights-at least the rights of blacks. But if reaction to Recon59. See, e.g., the jury discrimination cases cited supra note 12; Ex parte Yarborough,
110 U.S. 651 (1884); United States v. Gale, 109 U.S. 65 (1883); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S.
(1881); Exparte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399 (1880); Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1880).
60. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) (upholding a Kentucky statute requiring corporations to provide separate but equal schools); Hodges v. United States, 203
U.S. 1 (1906) (holding that the Court did not have jurisdiction under the Thirteenth Amendment to hear a charge of conspiracy, made and carried out in a state, to prevent citizens, on
account of their race, from making contracts to labor); Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146 (1904)
(holding that the Court did not have jurisdiction to review an Alabama state court's dismissal of a black citizen's complaint in which he alleged that he had arbitrarily been denied the
right to vote on account of his race); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903) (holding that
section 5507, Revised Statutes, which prohibited interferences with the right of suffrage
guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment, was an invalid exercise of power granted under
that amendment); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903) (holding that a U.S. circuit court in
Alabama did not have jurisdiction over a suit brought by a black Alabama resident on
behalf of himself and others to compel enrollment of their names on county voting lists);
Cumming v. Board of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899) (upholding a Georgia state court decision
that allowed a school district to close a black high school for lack of funds while still maintaining a white high school); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898) (upholding Mississippi statutes imposing literacy requirements as a qualification to vote); Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding a Louisiana statute requiring separate but equal train accommodations for white and black passengers); Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887)
(ruling unconstitutional, as applied to Chinese subjects, sections 5519, 5508, and 5336 of the
Revised Statutes-section 5519 relating to conspiracy to deprive of equal protection, section
5508 relating to injury or threats for exercise or attempted exercise of rights, and section
5336 relating to conspiracy to overthrow the government); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883) (holding unconstitutional sections 1 and 2 of the Civil Rights Act of March 1, 1875,
which provided for full and equal enjoyment of public accommodations and amusements
because they were not authorized by the 13th or 14th Amendments); United States v. Harris,
106 U.S. 629 (1883) (holding unconstitutional section 5519 of the Revised Statutes, which
made it a crime for two or more individuals to deprive any persons or class of persons equal
protection of the law).
61. Act of Feb. 8, 1894, ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36; Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 341, 35 Stat. 1088,
1153.
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struction, followed by the "hands off' policy of the federal judiciary for
many years thereafter, in part accounts for the poor civil liberties record of Southern courts, it cannot explain the abdication of state courts
in California, New York, or Arizona. The blame must lie elsewhere.
Although I cannot prove the charge, I suggest there is probable
cause to attribute the default of the state judiciary in vindicating civil
liberties for several decades to the high-handedness-and wrongheadedness-of the Supreme Court of the United States between 1890
and 1937. By narrow majorities, the Court for a time held back the
concerted attempt of business interests to invoke the Privileges and Immunities and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment as a
basis for invalidating state economic and social legislation.6 2 But then
the dam broke, and the Supreme Court began to void state rate regulation as "confiscation" 6 3 and labor legislation as a deprivation of the
"liberty of contract."'
For the moment, I am not focusing on the consequences of this
half-century of extraordinary arrogance by the Supreme Court insofar
as it dangerously divided American society, imperilling our democratic
system, or even insofar as it caused lasting injury to federal-state relations generally. Rather, my concern is how the Court's total disregard
for the judgment of the state courts affected the state judiciary. It will
be noted that, in almost all of the cases during this period, the highest
court of the state had sustained the local statute or agency action
against constitutional challenge. On review, the Supreme court in
Washington rarely noticed the opinion below, even when affirming the
judgment. And all too often, of course, the state court ruling was cavalierly reversed.
Such repeated chastisement, or dismissive snubbing, was not calculated to enhance the prestige or self-respect of the state courts. This
was especially true at a time when, despite its undemocratic stance, the
Supreme Court of the United States enjoyed unparalleled standing-so
much so that even Franklin Roosevelt could not persuade the Congress
to curb the Court's power. What is more, to the extent that state courts
62. See, e.g., Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623 (1887); Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1878); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113
(1877); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
63. See, e.g., Ohio Valley Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920); Smyth v.
Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894);
Chicago, M. & S.P. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
64. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U.S. 1 (1915); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S.
578 (1897).
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were grudgingly taking their cue from the Court in Washington, what
they learned was that the Fourteenth Amendment protected the property of the privileged, not the personal liberty of the underclass.
And so we come to the undistinguished late 1930's, 1940's, and
early 1950's, during which both state and federal courts frequently
looked the other way when civil liberties were at stake. Of course,
there were, even then, a few exceptions among the judges of both systems and they occasionally persuaded a majority on their courts. The
United States Supreme Court did not often speak out in defense of
liberty or equality, and thus no clear message emerged. Then, before
most state courts had entirely become used to their recaptured independence and accepted the responsibility that goes with it, the status quo
gradually changed once again. This newest change culminated in the
bold constitutional rulings of the Warren Court.
It is little wonder that, on the whole, the state courts were unprepared. Compared to the excruciatingly slow and hesitant pace of previous decades, the single decade of the 1960's seemed a whirlwind. Now,
suddenly, most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights were made fully
applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.65 The Equal Protection Clause was invigorated in
ways that were unthinkable a few years earlier. 66 Even the Thirteenth 67 and Fifteenth68 Amendments were implemented. Long forgot65. The main decisions are collected in Brennan, State Constitutionsand the Protection
ofIndividualRights, 90 HARV. L. Rav. 489, 493-94 (1977).
66. See id at 491-92.
67. See, e.g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1971) (holding that provisions of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 regarding literacy, minimum age in
national elections, and residency were constitutionally valid); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409, 437-44 (1968) (holding 42 U.S.C. § 1982 is applicable to all racial discrimination in the sale or rental of property under power granted to Congress by the Thirteenth
Amendment).
68. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (holding that the ban on state literacy tests
is constitutional and that Congress has broad powers to regulate federal elections and maintain a national government); Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969) (upholding district court's decision that use of literacy test, coupled with inferior schools for blacks,
was discriminatory); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (holding challenged
sections of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 valid in order to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial voting discrimination); United States v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602 (1960) (holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1957 expressly authorizes actions against a state for racially
discriminatory practices); United States v. Thomas, 362 U.S. 58 (1960) (relying on United
States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960), the Court affirmed a stay of injunction prohibiting
respondent from challenging the right of black citizens to remain on the registrar roles of a
Louisiana parish); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960) (the Fifteenth Amendment
prohibits discrimination by public officials in voter registration on the basis of race).
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ten Reconstruction statutes were resurrected. 69 And, once again, lower
federal courts were encouraged to intervene in state court proceedings
71
7
through the use of injunction, " removal, and habeas corpus.
All this was too much to absorb. As the Chief Justice of Minnesota recently testified, "The initial reaction of State judges to the 19601970 extension of the authority of the federal courts was hostile and
defensive. 7 2 Many state judges simply took the stance of letting the
federal courts do the unpopular work of vindicating the new rights applied to those accused of crimes and to those victimized by discrimination. But soon, most state courts caught up, and, indeed, a few got
ahead of the nation's high court. 73 By then, of course, the United
States Supreme Court was in partial retreat-as it still is. The upshot is
that, for the last few years, state appellate courts often have been reversed for reading too much into the Bill of Rights or the Equal Protection Clause, especially in the area of criminal procedure.
III
What does this history suggest? One lesson is clear: if left alone,
state courts are fully capable of vindicating the rights of most citizens
against govermental oppression when the ultimate responsibility is
theirs. But they tend to default when their judgments are too often
reviewed and revised by federal courts.7 4 In that climate, the state
courts tend to become weak-first angry, then apathetic-and inclined
to pass the buck in cases involving unpopular causes. It follows, I
think, that the federal courts, including the Supreme Court, must get
off the backs of the state courts. To this extent, I share the perceptions
69. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Johnson v. Ry. Express, Inc.,
421 U.S. 454 (1975); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); Adickes v. S. H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1940); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966); United
States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
70. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
71. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
72. Sheran, State CourtsandFederalism in the 1980"r, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 789, 791
(1981).
73. As early as 1977, Justice Brennan was able to give many examples. See Brennan,
supra note 65, at 498-502. See also the grudging concession by Professor Neuborne in the
same year. Neubore, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1105, 1116 n.45, 1121 n.59
(1977). Subsequent developments are sufficiently revealed in the increasing number of cases
in which the Supreme Court of the United States faults a state court for reading the Bill of
Rights too expansively. See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
74. Welsh, Whose Federalism? The Burger Court's Treatment of State Civil Liberties
Judgments, 10 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 819 (1983).

182

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 11:165

of the conservatives in the Congress and in legal academe." But when
we come to the means to that end, I part company very quickly.
Indeed, I am not sure we all have the same end in view. Once
upon a time, some of our great judges-Cardozo, Frankfurter, Jackson,
and John Harlan the Second-argued that the Bill of Rights ought not
be made fully applicable to the states on the ground that states and
their courts ought to be free to "experiment" with less rigorous standards of governmental and judicial conduct.7 6 1 utterly reject that proposition, which, put crudely, amounts to saying that states may treat
their citizens with less due process than the Constitution requires of the
national government. Of course, the Supreme Court has now firmly
established that there are not two Bills of Rights-a "full" version for
the United States and a "watered down" version for the states.77 And
78
there is no real prospect of turning back the clock on this point.
Two alternative strategies remain for those who believe the War-

ren Court extended constitutional rights too far, imposing an intolerable "straitjacket" on state governmental conduct. The first is to "water
down" the Bill of Rights-as well as the Equal Protection Clause-in
all cases, state and federal. There has been a good deal of that re-

cently.79 The other approach is to restrict federal court review of state
court judgments, mainly by narrowing habeas corpus,80 by expanding
the doctrine of Younger v. Harris,"' and, finally, by withholding
Supreme Court review. These methods have all been used in the name
75. See, e.g., Bator, The State Courtsand Federal ConstitutionalLitigation, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 605 (1981); Sheran, supra note 73; O'Connor, Trends in the Relationshi Between the Federaland State Courtsfrom the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 801 (1981); Aldisert, State Courtsand Federalismin the 1980s: Comment, 22
WM. & MARY L. REV. 821 (1981).

76. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 117 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring and
dissenting); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 801 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 496 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting); Beauharnais
v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 288 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323-25 (1937).
77. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964).
78. SeeFirst Nat'1 Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780-81 n.16 (1978). But see
the dissenting opinion of Justice Powell, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist,
in Cris v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 40, 52-53 (1978).
79. See, e.g., the instances recited in Brennan, supra note 65, at 496-98.
80. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S.
536 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
81. 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (holding that federal courts could not enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions except under special circumstances). See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415
(1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977);
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
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of the "new federalism," returning to the states and their courts a substantial part of the their historic independence. But, whether intended
or not, the effect of this "new federalism" may be to dilute the force of
the Bill of Rights where it matters most-in restraining local government-when such a result is prohibited in a federal case. Indeed, Professor Neuborne has written that much of the talk about "federalism,"
"deference," and "comity" is merely "a pretext for funneling federal
constitutional decisionmaking into state courts precisely because they
[are thought] less likely to be receptive to vigorous enforcement of fed-

eral constitutional doctrine."

2

While I do not subscribe to the Professor's suspicion, it is true that
the Court has undertaken to review and reverse state courts when they
have construed the Bill of Rights too generously. As early as 1975,
Justice Thurgood Marshall noted and questioned the Court's "increasingly common practice of reviewing state court decisions upholding
constitutional claims in criminal cases."83 Except for Justice Brennan,
who joined Marshall's dissent, the Court dismissed Marshall's concern

as an intolerable new heresy.84 Undeterred, the High Court has continued on its course with added momentum. For instance, in five cases
last Term, the Court concluded that state courts in Texas, Illinois, and
Michigan read the Fourth Amendment more broadly than was necessary." Likewise, it reversed a ruling of the California Supreme Court
setting aside the death penalty,86 as well as a ruling in another Eighth
82. Neuborne, supra note 73, at 1105-06.
83. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714,726 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall
also stated, "I can see absolutely no reason for departing from the usual course of remanding
the case to permit the state court to consider any other claims, including the possible applicability of state law to the issue treated here." Id at 729 (citing Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S.
47, 57 (1973); California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 434 (1971); California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 168-70 (1979)).
84. Oregon v. Hass, supra note 83, at 719-20 & n.4.
85. Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983) (holding that protective search of an automobile's passenger compartment during an investigatory stop was "reasonable" where defendant had been driving at excessive speed and appeared to be under the influence); Illinois
v. Andreas, 103 S. Ct. 3319 (1983) (holding the reopening of a sealed container, without a
warrant but after a prior legal search, did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Illinois v.
Lafayette, 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983) (holding police inventory of arrestee's personal effects,
without a warrant, was consistent with Fourth Amendment); Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct.
2317 (1983) (changing test for probable cause to a common sense determination of the "totality of the circumstances"); Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983) (under "plain view"
doctrine, there was no violation of Fourth Amendment rights when officer seized a balloon
containing heroin without being certain of its contents).
86. California v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct. 3446 (1983) (holding California statute mandating
that a capital sentencing jury be instructed regarding the Governor's power to commute a
life sentence is constitutional).
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Amendment case, this time from the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts," and a Fifth Amendment case from the Oregon Court of
88
Appeals.
The current activity of the Supreme Court in the area of individual
rights tends to deprive state judges of the insulation from local pressure
they might derive from invoking the federal Bill of Rights in protecting
individual rights. It is, however, still possible for state appellate courts
to avoid Supreme Court review. As Justice Brennan has urged state
judges for some years, 89 the way out is expressly and unambiguously to
rest decisions on independent state law grounds--Le. a provision of the
state constitution.
Contrary to what some imply,9° this is in no sense "cheating," even
if the state constitutional provision and the comparable provision of the
federal Bill of Rights are identically worded. For the most part, of
course, the national Bill of Rights is a derivation from earlier state declarations.9 1 Thus, no one dares tell the courts of Pennsylvania that they
read too much into the guarantee of "freedom of speech" or Virginia
courts that they give too much scope to "freedom of religion." Nor is
there any reason for later-admitted states to concede that they were
copying the federal Bill of Rights, rather than emulating their older
sister states. Besides, if the national courts are not bound to look to
earlier state precedents in construing words borrowed from a pre-1791
state constitution-as they surely do not think they are-there is no
reason state courts must follow the United States Supreme Court in
giving meaning to like language in state constitutions.
There remain, of course, those cases in which state courts are
called upon to vindicate specificfederal rights, usually by way of defense. I cannot here rehearse all the arguments for and against increased or decreased exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts, a more
or less expansive right of removal, greater or lesser discretion to enjoin
state court proceedings, wider or more restrictive review by habeas
corpus, and more or less frequent and searching Supreme Court re87. Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 103 S. Ct. 2979 (1983) (holding that the constitutional duty of a municipality to obtain necessary medical care for a person injured by the
police force does not include a duty to compensate the medical care provider).
88. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 103 S. Ct. 2830 (1983) (accused man who initiated talk with
policeman, waived Miranda rights, and took polygraph test, held to have waived right to
counsel during interrogation).
89. See, e.g., Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120-21 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See also Brennan, supra note 65.
90. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 75, at 605-06 n.l.
91. For a complete catalog of the state antecedents to the federal Bill of Rights, see B.
SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND 53-91, 87-90 (1977).
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view. Generally, I believe the state courts today are both more willing
and more able to respect and apply the Bill of Rights than some of us
in the federal judiciary have been ready to concede. If "parity" between the two judicial systems is not a fact everywhere, I believe it is
well on the way to being achieved.
Accordingly, I do not resist the idea that state courts should enjoy
concurrent jurisdiction over most federal issues and that the intrusive
devices of removal, injunction, and collateral review ought to be reserved for rare cases. But I would not eliminate these remedies. For
me, justice is not amenable to cost-benefit analysis. Whatever the
price, I would not disarm the lower federal courts from righting the
plain deprivation of a right guaranteed by federal law. The Supreme
Court simply cannot perform that task alone. In my view, the solution
lies in greater self-restraint by the federal courts and increased respect
for the competence of the state judiciary. I am sanguine that even if
federal judges retain the power to intercede, but exercise that power
with more prudence and better manners, the state courts will resume
their historic place as guardians of our liberties. Indeed, as I have
noted, state courts today are often more generous in protecting citizens,
especially in their procedural rights, than the Supreme Court in Washington. In this exercise of states' rights they ought to be left alone.

IV
My optimism is almost unbounded. I even indulge the hope that
State courts will also rise to the most difficult challenge of all: to insist
that local governments accord equal protection to those who belong to
a traditionally victimized racial or ethnic group. But I am too old and
too cautious to rely on faith alone. If history suggests that state courts
usually respond well when they believe that they enjoy ultimate responsibility, there remain especially difficult problems in areas where
state courts may still need the backing of federal courts.
Historically, many state courts have been unable to free themselves from local pressures and prejudice when adjudicating cases that
involved race. The Georgia courts defied the United States Supreme
Court in the Cherokee cases.9" More recently, the courts of several
Western states have likewise failed to respect the rights of Indian
92. Worcester v. Georgia, 10 U.S. (6 Pet.) 214 (1832) (holding that federal jurisdiction
over the Cherokees was exclusive and state had no power to pass laws affecting them or their
territory); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 9 U.S. (5 Pet.) 178 (1831) (holding that the Cherokee
nation was not a foreign nation). See generally 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN
UNITED STATES HIsToRY 733-34, 768-69 (1935).
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tribes.9 3 The courts of California have not always been alert to protect
Orientals from discrimination.94 In the Southwest, Hispanics have
sometimes received less than equal treatment in local courts. 95 And, of
course, there is the sad spectacle of Southern
courts joining in the mas96
sive resistance to the Brown decision.
In this area, the federal courts, more insulated from local influence, remain an indispensable safeguard. But it ought not be taken for
granted that state courts cannot vindicate the rights of unpopular minorities within their jurisdiction. Indeed, there are ample illustrations,
old and new, of courageous state judges resisting the tide of local
prejudice running against red, 97 yellow, 98 black,99 or brown' °° men and
93. The point is sufficiently illustrated by noting the occasions on which the United
States Supreme Court has found it necessary to review and reverse state court judgments
hostile to Indian rights from three states. Arizona: Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax
Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136
(1980); McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Warren Trading Post
Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
Montana: Fisher v. Dist. Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976); Kennerly v. Dist. Court, 400 U.S. 423
(1971). Washington: Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975); Washington
Game Dep't v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973); Satiacum v. Washington, 414 U.S. 1
(1973); Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dep't, 391 U.S. 392 (1968); Seymour v. Superintendent of Washington State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351 (1962); Tulee v. Washington, 315.
U.S. 681 (1942).
94. See supra notes 33-34 and the cases cited therein. An earlier California example is
People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 404-05 (1854). See also In re Woman's North Pac. Presby. Bd. of
Missions v. Ah Won, 18 Or. 339, 22 P. 1105 (1890).
95. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (holding that persons of Mexican
descent were a separate class, distinct from whites, who have a right to be indicted and tried
by juries from which all members of their class are not systematically excluded), and the
cases cited therein at 478 n.5.
96. For the most part, the southern state courts were spared a direct role in school desegregation. But, when called upon, they all too often lent their "loyal" aid in attempting to
disrupt the process. See, e.g., Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 187 F. Supp. 42, 43, 46
(E.D. La. 1960) (holding unconstitutional Louisiana statutes providing for 1) integration to
be implemented solely by the Legislature, 2) the Governor's assumption of school board
duties or the right to close schools, and 3) withholding supplies and funds from integrated
schools). One such contribution was in sustaining official persecution of the NAACP and its
members. The most notoriously persistent in this endeavor was the Alabama Supreme
Court, whose orders against the organization four times reached the Supreme Court of the
United States and finally provoked the impatient anger of that most temperate of judges,
Justice Harlan. See NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964).
97. See, e.g., State v. Tinno, 97 Idaho 759,497 P.2d 1386 (1972) (treaty granting Indians
hunting rights should be read to include fishing rights because the Indian language did not
distinguish them with separate verbs); State v. Arthur, 74 Idaho 251, 261 P.2d 135 (1953)
(holding that under a treaty between the United States and the Nez Perce Indians, which
reserves right to such Indians to hunt upon open and unclaimed lands, such Indians are
entitled to hunt at any time on any lands ceded to the federal government); State v. Campbell, 53 Minn. 354, 55 N.W. 553 (1893) (holding that Indians are not subject to criminal laws
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women. Today, when the state judiciary is far less vulnerable to direct
control by the electorate and federal law is more clearly declared, we
have reason to hope that such exceptions will become the rule.

Nevertheless, the federal courts must be ready to stand in the
breach if there is default. Federal judges ought to accord generous sup-

port when the state courts stir local hostility by faithfully following federal law.

Mixed signals should be avoided.

But, even in this

troublesome arena of race relations, state courts are not out of bounds.
On the contrary, local officials will naturally be more receptive to the
teachings of their own judiciary, who are, of course, bound by oath to
uphold the Constitution and laws of the United States. So far as possible, federal courts ought to encourage their brethren of the state courts

to assume a duty which is no less theirs.
Let me be clear as I conclude. Whether the officials involved wear

federal, state, or municipal uniforms, I do not for a moment advocate
relaxing the command of the Bill of Rights as it protects the citizen
of the state for acts committed by them on their reservation; criminal state laws do extend to
all crimes committed on a reservation by persons other than tribal Indians); Exparte Cross,
20 Neb. 417, 30 N.W. 428 (1886) (holding that state courts have no jurisdiction to prosecute
a crime committed by one Indian against another Indian as long as they maintain their
tribal relations). See also the decision of then Superior Court Judge Sandra Day O'Connor,
Superior Ct., Maricopa Cty., Cause No. 297870 reversed by the Arizona Supreme Court, 121
Ariz. 183, 589 P.2d 426 (1978), but vindicated by the United States Supreme Court in Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980) (holding that Central Machinery Co. was not licensed as an Indian trader and therefore imposition of a privileged tax
on sale to Indian community was not pre-empted by any congressional enactments passed to
protect Indian wards).
98. See, e.g., People v. Fujita, 215 Cal. 166, 8 P.2d 1011 (1932) (alleviating rigors of
Alien Land Law); In re Yano's Estate, 188 Cal. 645, 206 P. 995 (1922) (law forbidding Japanese from becoming guardian of minor citizen's agricultural land held invalid); Ex pare
Terui, 187 Cal. 20, 200 P. 954 (1921) (alien poll tax law held unconstitutional); Exparte Sing
Lee, 96 Cal. 354, 31 P. 245 (1892) (striking down ordinance conditioning right to maintain a
laundry on consent of neighbors).
99. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ayes., 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1836). Even during the
long era of black slavery, the courts of the slave states surprisingly often mitigated the rigors
of the "peculiar institution" with judgments recognizing slave rights. See generally Nash,
Reason of Slavery: Understandingthe JudicialRole in the PeculiarInstitution, 32 VAND. L.
REv. 7 (1979). A more recent example, of course, is the ruling of the Delaware courts invalidating school segregation, albeit partly on the ground of unequal facilities, before the Brown
decision. Belton v. Gebhart, 32 Del. Ch. 343, 87 A. 2d 862, a f'd, 33 Del. ch. 144, 91 A.2d
137 (1952), aft'd, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). Also note the momentary courage of the Virginia
Supreme Court in striking down a school closing law designed to frustrate desegregation.
Harrison v. Day, 200 Va. 439, 106 S.E.2d 636 (1959). But, alas, that stance was short-lived.
See Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 203 Va. 321, 124 S.E.2d 227 (1962); County School Bd.
v. Griffin, 204 Va. 650, 133 S.E.2d 565 (1963). Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court
had to intervene. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
100. See, ag., Clifton v. Puente, 218 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. 1948) (holding unenforceable a
restrictive covenant against the sale of land to persons of Mexican descent).
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against governmental oppression or inconvenient short cuts. Even less
would I dilute the force of the Equal Protection Clause as it forbids
discriminatory treatment by any government. Nor would I strip federal courts of the power to insure that these constitutional promises are
carried through. Even an enthusiastic new convert to "federalism"
cannot quite yet assert that all state judges today have the courage, the
heart, and the wisdom of a Mathew Tobriner. But I applaud state
judges who have resumed their historic role as the primary defenders of
civil liberties and equal rights. It is cause for celebration that so many
have been so bold. I invite those of my colleagues in the federal judiciary who, like me, have tended to deprecate the state courts, to embark
on a fresh approach-in which arrogant distrust gives way to respectful
appreciation of how much state judges have done and can do to vindicate liberty and equality for all our people. As for myself, I confess
past error and throw myself on the mercy of this audience.

